IL COMPLICATO ATTACCO AL DOLLARO... E NAZARBAYEV. (The complicated attack against the dollar... and Nazarbayev)

Il presidente russo Dmitrij Medvedev non è pienamente soddisfatto delle discussioni tenutesi al G20 di Londra. Uno dei temi più rilevanti, secondo il capo del Cremlino, non sarebbe stato discusso a fondo: lo sviluppo di un sistema monetario mondiale. L'approccio di Mosca si basa sulla necessità di sostenere forti valute regionali, in modo da utilizzarle successivamente come base per la creazione di una nuova valuta di riserva mondiale, eventualmente "ancorata" all'oro. Le reazioni di Obama e Gordon Brown sono state piuttosto fredde, almeno ufficialmente. Già, perchè pochi giorni prima, il titolare del Tesoro americano Geithner si era detto disponibile ad un più ampio ruolo dei diritti speciali di prelievo (SDRs) del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, facendo apparire così gli USA piuttosto vicini alle posizioni russe, dal momento che gli SDRs potrebbero svolgere il ruolo di superreserve currency. Tuttavia, alla vigilia del G20, lo stesso Arkady Dvorkovich, consigliere economico di Medvedev, aveva ammesso che "non tutti sono ancora pronti a sostituire il dollaro" ma che la Russia continuerà ad insistere su questa proposta "a tutti i livelli". La Cina, dal canto suo, si accoda a Mosca ed alle sue proposte di ristrutturazione dell'ordine economico mondiale. Pochi giorni prima, il governatore della Banca centrale cinese, Zhou Xiaochuan, aveva affermato che una nuova valuta internazionale ''non dovrebbe essere collegata a nazioni individuali''. Secondo l'autorità monetaria cinese, gli attori economici mondiali sarebbero troppo dipendenti dalle condizioni economiche e dalle decisioni del Paese di riferimento della valuta utilizzata (cioè dagli USA). Le condizioni di bilancio e le decisioni di politica economica di tale Paese, continua Pechino, potrebbero facilmente far sì (più o meno volutamente) che tale valuta si deprezzi, con conseguenze non piacevoli per chi, come la Cina, detiene quasi duemila miliardi di dollari di riserve.

Esiste un "dietro le quinte" che occorre tener in considerazione per comprendere il background della posizione russa, un "retroscena" che ci porta all'EurAsEC, la Comunità Economica Eurasiatica che raccoglie al suo interno Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus e Russia. I tentativi di Mosca di ri-creare una sorta di area rublo (dopo la sua venuta meno nel '93) nello spazio post-sovietico, hanno determinato una reazione diplomatico/economica da parte dell'altro Paese più rilevante della Comunità: il Kazakhstan. Cogliendo l'occasione della crisi, l'astuto presidente kazako Nazarbayev ha risposto alle offensive russe proponendo, per l'EurAsEC, un'unica nuova valuta, lo yevraz. L'iniziativa ha ovviamente suscitato fredde reazioni in Russia. Nazarbayev, da sempre in ottimi rapporti con Mosca, si è guardato bene, anche in questa circostanza, dall'entrare in "rotta di collisione" col Cremlino. La proposta dello yevraz è stata così accompagnata dalla proposta kazaka di una nuova valuta globale: l'acmetal. Appare evidente il tentativo di Nazarabayev di allinearsi alle posizioni monetarie internazionali di Mosca. Altrettanto evidente appare la volontà, da parte del Kazakhstan, di contrastare le tendenze espansionistiche del rublo in Asia Centrale. Sono due "lati" della stessa "medaglia": ambito regionale ed ambito mondiale s'intrecciano, in un gioco d'interessi diversi ma convergenti.

Ecco come Roman Muzalevsky ha spiegato le iniziative di Nazarbayev.

Dal Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 03/26/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev is neither shy about his vision of turning Kazakhstan into one of the world’s 50 most competitive countries, nor reserved in his ambitions ranging from the integration of Central Asia to the recent call for a single global currency to deal with the financial crisis. As the leaders of the G-20 countries prepare for a financial summit on April 2 in London, Nazarbaev has been advancing his proposal to deal with the global recession, and with it, his domestic and international clout.

“We must switch to a new global currency system, which will be based on a single global monetary unit,”- Nazarbayev underlined on March 10 at the congress of the Eurasian Universities Association, adding that Kazakhstan presented to the world with view of the solution. Claiming that a dollar currency is an undemocratic and unregulated world currency, the president proposes the creation of a single global currency under the UN auspices. Previously on his trip to India, Nazarbaev stated that “the future measures should ensure that we have a completely just global currency, and not with only one issuer as is the case today.” According to him, "the existing global financial monetary system does not meet current requirements and does not correspond to any criteria of a stable monetary system...”

The IMF reacted by saying the idea was “interesting, but poorly explored” as of now. Nobel Prize winner and economist Edmund Phelps partially supported the project, arguing that “there is no sense in having more than 90 currencies in the world,” while disagreeing that a single global currency alone will solve the problem. Another Nobel Prize winner, and the architect of the Euro currency, Robert Mundell, however, explicitly sided with the initiative: “…I agree with President Nazarbayev on his statement and many of the things he said in his plan...” Kazakhstan’s proposal for what Nazarbaev terms “acmetal” global currency might “look kind of funny” but in reality is a step in the right direction. The “acmetal” is a combination of two words: acme, the Greek word for “best,” and “capital.” Modern capitalism represents what Nazarbaev calls “defectalism.” Hence the need for a new financial-monetary system of “acmetalizm”, built on a more perfect capital.

Kazakhstan is not alone in proposing reforms of the financial order left over after a blow to the Bretton Woods system in 1971. German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed the creation of a UN economic council that would work out anti-crisis solutions, while British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner called for a centrally coordinated financial system. Ewald Nowotny, the European Central Bank member, stressed that a “tri-polar” currency system is already developing among the US, Europe, and Asia to replace the U.S. dollar-based financial order. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in his turn, stated that “the dollar cannot claim to be the only currency in the world,” arguing that “in the capitalism of the 21st century, there is room for the state.” Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, however, was cautious about the need to reengineer the volatile financial system: “We don't need to recreate the world right now. What people expect of us, quite frankly, in our countries is to get our own houses in order.'' Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, stressing the dangers of depending on a single uncontrolled global currency, has lobbied for a number of regional reserve currencies, including the Russian ruble. Sergei Perminov with the Rye, Man & Gor Securities brokerage firm in Russia, however, is pessimistic on the issue: "This is all in the realm of fantasy. Alternatives to the dollar are still hard to find."

In his “Keys to Crisis Resolution” article, Nazarbaev actually agreed to the idea of a single central bank, albeit without the Russian ruble being the regional legal tender. Deputy Chairman of “Ak Zhol” party Burihan Nurmuhamedov considers Nazarbaev’s proposals, including the one for a regional currency voiced at the Economic Forum on March 11, as a way to avert Russia’s plans to create Ruble-based regional currency within the EEC while welcoming a single regional currency along non-Russian lines.

Many, however, have voiced objections to the proposals requiring international centralization of the financial system, putting forward national sovereignty considerations and conspiracy-like propositions. “The control of money and credit strikes at the very heart of national sovereignty,” said A. Clausen, president of Bank of America.

The character of the many proposals is indeed controversial. Nazarbaev’s idea of a global currency, while shared by distinguished policy-makers and experts, may backfire at the upcoming financial summit. The complexity of the international system, functioning of different economies, time constrains and difficulties of common policy coordination, will stand in the way of Nazarbaev’s vision, providing less ambitious projects with more chances of being implemented, at least in the immediate future.

Passo e chiudo.
FRA

INCOMPRENSIONI? (Misuderstandings?)

Un simpatico articolo sul famoso episodio del pulsante "reset" regalato dal Segretario di Stato Hillary Clinton al Ministro degli Esteri russo Sergey Lavrov lo scorso 7 Marzo a Ginevra.

Dal sito pajamasmedia.com
Di Oleg Atbashian (8 Marzo 2009)

Did you know that if you translate “the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak” into Russian, it becomes “the vodka is agreeable but the meat has gone bad”? Literal translations can be tricky that way.

It seems that no translators were harmed in the manufacturing of Hillary Clinton’s “reset” button, which she presented to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Geneva on Friday.

“We worked hard to get the right Russian word,” Clinton addressed Lavrov in a deliberately slow voice, as if talking to a special-needs child. “Do you think we got it?”

“You got it wrong,” Lavrov answered in fluent English. “This says ‘peregruzka,’ which means overcharged.”

Well, it looks like somebody used a cheap electronic translation program. But it could be worse. I once came across a website that advertised its automated translation service with an example of a label from a jar of pickles, informing Russian consumers that it contained condoms.

Talk about food safety! That’s what you get when you translate “preservatives” without as much as a human touch.

Incidentally, Hillary Clinton’s linguistic episode in Geneva also clarified the translation of the Obama administration’s term “worked hard,” which in plain English means “did half-assed job.”

News reports would make us believe that Hillary’s philological mishaps ended right there. Not so. After the two top diplomats stopped laughing, Clinton quipped: “We won’t let you do that to us, I promise.”

That may have sounded sharp in English, but in Russian it came out even goofier than the wrong label on the red button.

Mrs. Clinton’s clever comeback implied that she understood “overcharge” in terms of charging too much money. We may even credit her with referring to the difference between an observed market price and a price that would have been observed in the absence of collusion, which was what many suspected the oil-producing nations were doing last year. In that sense, and only in that sense, was Hillary’s comment meaningful and amusing.

The problem is that the word “peregruzka” has nothing to do with economics. As students of foreign languages well know, most words have multiple meanings, and their combinations almost never coincide in different languages. Thus, the English word “overcharge” may mean many things to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but they are all translated into Russian by completely different words that are not interchangeable. In economic terms, “overcharge” becomes “obschitat’” or “zavysit’ tsenu” — but never “peregruzka.”

Perhaps, the embarrassment could be avoided if Lavrov had translated it literally, as “overload.” But in the context of a red button, he chose a more specific electrical term “overcharge,” meaning “too much amperage in the circuit.”

As a result, to the Russian-speaking audience, Hillary’s retort “We won’t let you do that to us” could only mean one thing: “Americans won’t let Sergey Lavrov give them too much amperage.”

The confusion could also be avoided if, instead of Hillary Clinton, the job of Secretary of State was performed by a professional — like Condoleezza Rice, who speaks fluent Russian, and who wouldn’t have opted for the lame plastic button because this joke doesn’t work in Russian to begin with.

Russian is a rich and flexible language with versatile descriptive means, but it just doesn’t have a short universal word that embraces all the meanings of the allusive English “reset.” The word “perezagruzka” (”reload”), which later was claimed to be the right term, comes off just as awkward and uninspiring as any other possible translation. Anyone with a sense of the Russian language could’ve told Clinton that the gag was a dud.

Other reports indicate that “Hillary Clinton raised eyebrows on her first visit to Europe as secretary of state when she mispronounced her EU counterparts’ names and claimed U.S. democracy was older than Europe’s.” In one particular case, she kept referring to European Commission External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner as “Benito,” invoking the memories of Mussolini.

This looks rather ironic, considering that the current leaders in Washington had come to power by accusing their conservative predecessors of being pig-headed and deaf to other cultures and nuances. Turns out, they were merely projecting their own image on their opponents, given that they themselves can’t even distribute party favors to foreigners without a screw-up.

But let’s not be too hard on Hillary — according to her, the button was also a gift of friendship from President Obama and Vice President Biden. All things considered, the gaffe was the result either A or B:

A) The Obama administration is made of pig-headed, tone-deaf people, who don’t expect other cultures to have nuances — and so they don’t bother to consult with experts.

B) Experts chosen by the Obama administration are incompetent sycophants who got hired because they were political hacks, or as a result of favoritism, nepotism, or affirmative action — and they will uncritically ramrod their bosses’ ideas even if it’s contrary to reality and common sense.

Either way we’re screwed.

Why couldn’t have Hillary consulted with someone competent — like me, for example? Without overcharging, I would’ve advised her to give Lavrov the People's Cube [si tratta di una sorta di cubo di Rubik comunista inventato dall'autore; vedere immagine sotto] instead of the button.

It requires no tricky translation and is easy to understand in any language or culture. Remember Hillary’s campaign speech about “invisible Americans?” Well, if you translate “out of sight, out of mind” into Russian, you will get “invisible lunatics.”

Which accurately describes what competent people in this country have become since the last election



Passo e chiudo.
FRA

L'ISOLA CHE NON C'E'... PIU'. (Neverland... no more)

Con le dimissioni il 26 Gennaio del Primo Ministro Haarde, dopo mesi di manifestazioni di protesta, si chiude un capitolo della storia islandese. Non un capitolo politico, bensì un capitolo economico. In realtà infatti, per comprendere la parabola economica dell'Islanda dobbiamo considerare un arco di tempo nel quale si sono succeduti governi di diverso colore. Anzi, lo stesso governo Haarde si configurava come un governo, diremmo in altri contesti, di "grande coalizone", tra il l'Independence Party (di Haarde) ed i socialdemocratici. A fare le spese delle gravissima crisi finanziaria che ormai da parecchio tempo ha colpito l'isola è dunque stata la prima componente: il presidente della Repubblica Grímsson ha affidato ai socialdemocratici l'incarico di formare un governo di minoranza in attesa di elezioni anticipate a fine primavera. Ne è scaturito un governo presieduto da Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir (prima donna alla guida del Paese e primo Primo Ministro dichiaratamente omosessuale al mondo), in coalizione con Verdi ed estrema sinistra e con l'appoggio esterno dei centristi del Progressive Party.

Fin qui le vicende politiche. Ma valutiamo ora come un Paese ritenuto generalmente (o almeno nell'opinione comune) ricco e stabile sia sprofondato (prima di altri, s'intende ormai) in un simile abisso economico. E sì, perchè la "crisi " di cui tutti parlano (e straparlano) oggi, in Islanda era già evidente nel 2006. Chiediamoci allora: il caso islandese ci mostrava già che qualcosa "non andava"? Dovevamo (almeno) già nel 2006 guardare con sospetto all'economia Usa, alla luce di ciò che accadeva a Reykjavík? Dovevamo notare i rischi di una crescita basata sull' "aria fritta"? Giudicate voi.
In realtà, come ora è a tutti facile intuire, l'Islanda non era (ed a maggior ragione adesso, "non è") un Paese così "ricco". Il PIL nominale risultava alla vigilia dell'ultima crisi intorno ai 20 miliardi di dollari (per meno di 320.000 abitanti, dato decisivo), ma tenendo conto del costo della vita il PIL avrebbe raggiunto appena i 12 miliardi. Le riforme degli anni '90 hanno dunque fatto crescere economicamente l'isola (+ 6% all'anno), ma su basi che, come vedremo, erano tutt'altro che solide. In altre parole, si accumulavano vulnerabilità.
Anzitutto era presente un problema di natura fiscale: un elevato rapporto deficit/PIL e persistenti disavanzi di parte corrente. In particolare risultava critico il settore esterno, con limitate esportazioni (ed un elevato indebitamento estero). Il fatto poi che la krona fosse una valuta certamente "debole", rendeva l'isola particolarmente esposta ad attacchi speculativi. Il rischio ovviamente, come abbiamo potuto notare nelle crisi valutarie degli anni '80 e '90, era quello di un fenomeno di capital reversal all'aumentare del rischio e dell'instabilità. Essendo la krona fluttuante nel global forex market (il mercato valutario), le autorità islandesi, al fine di ottenere valuta in prestito, offrivano tassi d'interesse più che ragguardevoli, specie rispetto a UE ed a Stati Uniti. Prendeva così il via un vasto fenomeno di carry trade, una tecnica di arbitraggio valutario che consiste nel prendere a prestito vaste somme nei mercati caratterizzati da bassi tassi d'interesse (ad esempio in Svizzera) ed investirle in obbligazioni a lunga scadenza emesse da Paesi che pagano interessi elevati. Enormi flussi di capitali giungevano così da tutto il mondo in un mercato mobiliare e immobiliare da 320.000 abitanti! Col tempo si formava dunque una vera e propria "bolla speculativa" nel mercato immobiliare: si assisteva di fatto all'enorme gonfiarsi del valore degli assets detenuti dalle banche e dalle società finanziarie, con l'esponenziale aumentare del rischio di collasso e crollo dell'intero sistema finanziario al momento dello scoppio della bolla stessa. Se a tutto questo aggiungiamo come nel corso del decennio precedente il settore privato sia pesantemente ricorso al credito, chiedendo sempre più prestiti per investimenti sempre più rischiosi, allora risulta chiaro come si affacciasse anche un problema di allocazione efficiente del risparmio e, per converso, un problema di sovrafinanziamento.
Le premesse per una crisi valutario-finaziaria sul modello della crisi che nel '97-'98 aveva coinvolto le cosiddette "Tigri Asiatiche" vi erano tutte.
Ed ecco il contributo della Banca Centrale islandese: un aumento dei tassi per raffreddare l'economia... ed ecco invece (forse non si conosceva il significato della parola "globalizzazione") nuovi afflussi di capitali dall'estero! Nuovi prestiti, nuovi investimenti, nuovi consumi, nuovo surriscaldamento. Dal 2004 al 2006 le azioni della insignificante Borsa islandese erano quadruplicate. E allora ancora nuovi soldi (telematici) da UE e USA soprattutto. Le minuscole banche islandesi si trovarono in breve con debiti (anche all'estero) superiori di molte volte lo stesso PIL dell'isola. Qualsiasi garanzia di bailout da parte delle autorità islandesi, veniva di fatto meno. O più precisamente veniva meno la stessa credibilità, la stessa fiducia in una garanzia di salvataggio. Il "giocattolo" si stava inesorabilmente rompendo. In particolare bastò che un'agenzia di rating (Fitch) esprimesse dubbi sulla sostenibilità dell'indebitamento islandese per far passare il Paese da un "boom" ad una recessione e ad una depressione profonda, aggravata naturalmente dalla crisi che nel 2008 dagli Usa sta pian piano contagiando il mondo intero. E così arriviamo ai giorni nostri, dove Reykjavík cerca e cercherà probabilmente di rimodulare anzitutto la propria posizione internazionale. Stop all'alleanza preferenziale con gli USA responsabili della nuova crisi che sta colpendo duramente (anche) l'isola. Stop al rapporto privilegiato con i tradizionali alleati scandinavi , Norvegia e Danimarca, colpevoli di aver richiesto condizioni impossibili per un prestito di 6 miliardi di dollari. Riavvicinamento alla Russia, cui è stata peraltro proposta la gestione della base aerea di Keflavic, utilizzata dalla NATO durante la Guerra Fredda. Riavvicinamento all'UE, anche se l'orizzonte dell'adesione rimane, se mai vi sarà, piuttosto distante. L'obiettivo sarebbe quello di sbarazzarsi di una una krona sempre meno brillante. Il tentativo di Ottobre di istituire un cambio fisso a 131 corone per euro è miseramente fallito. La Banca Centrale, Sedlabanki, non aveva riserve valutarie per sostenerlo. Gli operatori neppure si sono accorti dell'acquisto da parte della BC di 786 milioni di corone per 6 milioni di euro. La Sedlabanki di fatto, già in Ottobre, risultava in frantumi.
O Islanda, splendido esempio di finto capitalismo. O Islanda, ci precedi e ci mostri la via. O Islanda ci avevi illuso fosse facile guadagnare e crescere. E ora sei solo un' isola che non c'è. O meglio, un' "isola che non c'è", che ora non c'è più.
Passo e chiudo.
FRA

UNA BANCA CENTRALE MONDIALE? (A world central bank?)

Ho come l'impressione che faremmo meglio a tenere sott'occhio nei prossimi mesi il seguente articolo tratto dal sito di Time. Il titolo reca esplicitamente un'espressione che per molti assidui frequentatori del web risulta ormai familiare: "New World Order", formula oscura e polisemica oltre che ambigua. Può essere quello descritto nell'articolo l'inizio di questo nuovo ordine? Di ordini internazionali nei secoli se ne sono succeduti tanti, ma nessuno scritto a lettere maiuscole (come nell'articolo di Time) ...

(Da TIME 05-02-2009)

"New World Order" by Justin Fox

In recent weeks, the world has been politely standing by and watching how things play out with the fiscal stimulus and latest bank-bailout plans in Washington. Yes, there's been some grumbling overseas about "buy American" provisions in the stimulus bill, but for the most part, officials elsewhere don't want to step on the toes of a new President to whom they are favorably disposed. They also don't want to endanger legislation that they hope will help jump-start the global economy.

Just wait a couple of months, though. Politicians from Beijing to Berlin to Brasília see the current crisis as the product of a messed-up global financial infrastructure dominated by the U.S., and they will soon be pushing for big changes--whether Americans like them or not.

All this will begin to gel on April 2, when the newish international organization known as the G-20--the leaders of 19 of the world's biggest national economies, plus the European Union--meets in London. An unofficial meeting has already taken place, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where G-20 officials (with the conspicuous exception of those from the U.S.) made speeches, conversed in the halls and gave a sense of the direction in which the world outside the U.S. wants to head.

The global discussion of the financial crisis is strikingly different from the one in the U.S. Here there's still something of a debate over whether the mess is the result of too much government interference in the housing market or too little government regulation of financial markets. In the rest of the world, that's no debate: inadequate and inconsistent financial regulation is uniformly blamed. What's more, a consensus seems to have emerged among the world's finance ministers and central-bank bosses that the chief underlying cause of the crisis was an unbalanced and out-of-control system of global capital flows in which some big-spender countries (namely the U.S.) ran up huge debts while big savers (China and India, for example) hoarded surpluses.

On the regulatory front, the path to a new global approach is pretty clear. Last spring the leaders of the G-7, a club of wealthy nations, agreed to create a "college of supervisors" to more closely coordinate regulation of multinational banks. The Group of Thirty, an influential organization of current and former central bankers and financial regulators, recommended in January that "systematically significant" financial institutions (those that are too big to fail) be identified in advance and subjected to higher capital requirements and tougher regulation.

Yet regulators around the world were already jointly setting bank-capital standards before the current crisis hit. A lot of good that did us. So there is also much talk about the need for a new architecture--"a new Bretton Woods" was a phrase that echoed around Davos--to rein in global financial flows.

Bretton Woods is the mountain resort in New Hampshire where in 1944 the Allied nations met--with the U.S. calling almost all the shots--to plan a postwar financial system. The Bretton Woods creations included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and a quarter-century of fixed exchange rates built around a U.S. dollar that was linked to gold. The fixed exchange rates and gold standard unraveled in the 1970s, and ever since we've had a system in which the IMF occasionally steps in to help countries in currency crises (usually imposing harsh terms in the process) but exercises no real control over the global financial system.

After the emerging-market currency collapses of the late 1990s, in which IMF aid wasn't much help, the lesson that emerging economies such as China and India took was that they needed to build up gigantic reserves of U.S. dollars to protect their currencies. To build those reserves, they ran big trade surpluses, which were in turn enabled mainly by record trade deficits in the U.S., which were in turn enabled by massive borrowing from around the world. It was an extremely unbalanced financial ballet, and it has now come crashing to the ground.

In the view of many outside the U.S. (and some within), the only way to limit such excesses is through a bigger, more powerful IMF that can act as a central bank to the world--and knock heads when needed. While everybody agrees that this new IMF needs to be less dominated by the U.S. and Western Europe, things get controversial as soon as you go past voting rights. Should capital flows be restricted? Should there be limits on trade deficits and surpluses? Should the IMF be able to order around even the U.S.? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, global capitalism will have entered a new and dramatically less freewheeling era.

IL TRIANGOLO DEL GAS. (The gas triangle)

E' una partita a tre quella che si sta giocando sul gas russo. Come al solito tra Mosca e Kiev volano le accuse. La Tymoshenko punta ad un negoziato bilaterale senza Bruxelles, i cui osservatori ormai hanno acclarato le responsabilità ucraine per il mancato transito del gas verso ovest. E' un film già visto. Questa volta però c'è un'aggravante: l'Ucraina è oggi un Paese totalmente allo sbando. Così, viste le temperature polari, c'è chi nell'UE proprio non vuole rischiare un intero mese senza riscaldamenti accesi: è la Slovacchia, uno degli Stati terzi più colpiti da questa crisi del gas. Il governo Fico ha infatti preannunciato l'intenzione di voler riattivare (Commissione Europea permettendo) uno dei vecchi reattori nucleari di Jaslovske Bohunice.

Da RIA Novosti (14-01-2009)

With EU countries left without Russian gas supplies for more than a week and no sign of an end to the deadlock between Kiev and Moscow, Europe questioned on Wednesday the credibility of Russia and Ukraine as reliable gas suppliers.

Moscow and Kiev failed to reach an agreement on a new gas contract for 2009 on December 31, which led to Russian energy giant Gazprom suspending supplies to Ukraine on January 1. Gazprom cut off supplies to Europe a week later saying Ukraine was stealing gas intended for EU consumers.

Following mediation by the EU the two sides agreed to resume supplies, however a test delivery failed on Tuesday and Russian gas via Ukraine has so far failed to reach the EU, leading Moscow to accuse Kiev of blocking the gas deliveries.

UKRAINE ON THE DEFENSIVE

Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko reassured the European Union on Wednesday that Ukraine remained a reliable transit country for Russian gas.

"Ukraine is interested in being perceived by Europe as a reliable Russian gas transit partner," Tymoshenko told a government session on Wednesday.

Ukraine has claimed that Russia has not sent enough "technical gas" to maintain the pressure necessary to send the required volumes to Europe. Kiev also said that Moscow had demanded gas for Europe be sent along a complicated route that would require Ukraine to cut off domestic supplies.

Tymoshenko urged Kiev and Moscow to reach an agreement on a new gas contract at bilateral talks without Europe's mediation.

"Talks on a contract for natural gas supplies to Ukraine are a bilateral issue, and Ukraine and Russia should cope on their own," Tymoshenko said at a news briefing, in an apparent contradiction of Ukraine's energy minister.

Yuriy Prodan said on Tuesday he had secured the European Union's preliminary consent to mediate in the ongoing gas dispute between the two former Soviet neighbors, which has hit European consumers hard.

RUSSIA SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY?

"We hear our Ukrainian colleagues say there are some problems, but these are not our problems. They [Ukrainians] should solve these problems on their own," the Russian prime minister said.

Commenting on the concerns of his European partners at a Wednesday meeting with his counterparts from Slovakia, Moldova and Bulgaria, Vladimir Putin said Moscow's row with Kiev was only about gas supplies to Ukraine itself, not about gas flow through the country.

"This is a conflict over supplies, conditions and the price of gas for Ukraine itself," the Russian premier said.

Gazprom earlier said that as Ukraine had refused an earlier preferential price of $250 per 1,000 cubic meters it would now have to pay "the average European market price of $450-470," a condition Tymoshenko dismissed as "unacceptable."

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin said Gazprom's losses sustained over Ukraine's refusal to transit Russian gas to Europe had reached $1.2 billion.

He said Russia is considering alternative routes for gas supplies to Europe, including from West Siberia.

The Russian premier said that Ukraine had taken European gas consumers hostage by refusing to transit gas through the country. He also urged the European Commission to put more pressure on Kiev to ensure gas transits to Europe via Ukraine.

"European Commission members could put more pressure on the transit country to secure the interest of EU members," Putin said.

He also said Russia was ready to consider other scenarios to resume gas flows to Europe.

EUROPE HIT, THREATENS LEGAL ACTION

The crisis has hit about 20 EU countries in the height of winter, forcing them to close schools, factories and leaving householders without heating.

European partners are losing trust in Ukraine over problems with Russian gas transits to the EU, the Slovak prime minister said.

"I told [Ukrainian Prime Minister] Tymoshenko: Ukraine is losing the trust of European partners due to its behavior," Robert Fico said, adding that his country was not going to judge who was to blame in the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute.

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso was reported to have called the crisis "unacceptable and incredible" and warned the EU could advise energy firms to sue Russian and Ukrainian energy companies unless gas supplies were restored quickly.

Slovakia, one of the worst-hit EU member countries, also proposed a gas swap deal, under which Ukraine would deliver gas to the country from its own underground storage depots, with Russia compensating Kiev by sending equal volumes at a later date.

"Gazprom said such technical possibilities exist and if Ukraine approves the idea, we will be ready to put it into practice as soon as possible," Russian President Dmitry Medvedev assured the premiers of Bulgaria, Slovakia and Moldova.

Greece hinted on Wednesday it would seek compensation from Russia over shortages in gas deliveries.

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Da Radio Slovakia International (14-01-09)


The European Commission will evaluate the possible restarting of the second V1 reactor block at Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plan not only from the legal point of view but also from the perspective of the current extraordinary situation and its impact on Slovak people, according to the EU Commissioner for Energy's spokesman Ferran Tarradellas. He added that on Monday the European Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso sent a letter to the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico that clearly points out that re-launching the reactor block would mean a breach of Slovakia's accession treaty. Brussels has asked Slovakia to clarify its reasons for planning such a move. According to Tarradellas, the European Commission is waiting for a response, and only after careful analysis it will be able to decide on any further steps against Slovakia. “We’ll analyse the report and then we'll decide," he added, noting that the Commission is doing everything possible to help tackle the situation in Slovakia.

Over the past week since the natural gas exports from Russia were completely cut off, the Slovak government has many times declared its intention to restart one of the two recently de-comissioned blocks at the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant. It was shut down only two weeks ago according to a clause in the accession treaty of Slovakia to the European Union. Even more the European Commission allocated about 600 million euro for the period 1999-2013 in compensations to Slovakia for decommissioning the two blocks which have Russian reactors which are considered unsafe by the Commission.



Passo e chiudo.
FRA

CHE COSA E' HAMAS. (What Hamas is)

Mi pare il caso di mettere i puntini sulle "i". L'intervento israeliano a Gaza ha invitato più o meno sprovveduti cronisti, giornalisti, commentatori, analisti, politologi e politici ad affermazioni, nel migliore dei casi, superficiali. Si parla di razzi lanciati da Hamas, si parla di trattare o meno con Hamas, etc. In maniera preliminare sarebbe però necessario rispondere alla domanda: "chi" o "che cosa" è Hamas? Si tratta di una questione fondamentale al fine di comprendere una piccola parte (ma decisiva) del conflitto che per l'ennesima volta sta creando orrore in Medio Oriente.

Questa intervista ad Eric Margolis, editorialista del Toronto Sun ed esperto di Medio Oriente, ha proprio il merito di mettere i puntini sulle "i" in merito al "che cosa" sia Hamas.

Passo e chiudo.
FRA